gulf of tonkin conspiracy

Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." ." Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. IV-2 to IV-4. . The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. 11. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. 1, p. 646. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. The Taliban silenced him. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Suns and Stars Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. 12. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. The Health Conspiracy. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Naval Institute. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History 17. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed.

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